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Abstract 
 
As a result of their rapid economic growth, several powerful corporate giants have emerged in 
developing countries, especially in China, operating not only in the traditional manufacturing 
sector, but also in high-tech industries and finance. Major cities in developing countries have 
gradually become important command and control centres of the global economy, and have 
also become powerful enough to be in the same tier as major cities of developed countries 
around the world. In this paper, I examine the position of cities as command and control centres 
on the basis of the power of their headquartered corporations. The result shows that until 2012, 
New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris; i.e., the global cities, were the leading command and 
control centres. However, the gap between these global cities and Beijing gradually closed, and 
by 2015, the Chinese capital outranked all the global cities. The outstanding performance of 
Beijing-based corporations that operate in financial, energy, and construction services sectors 
is the driving force behind Beijing’s increasing global power. In addition, the leading position 
of the global cities as command and control centres has been threatened by the San Francisco-
San Jose metropolitan region, a newly emerging economic hub in the United States. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Within the framework of the post-industrial economy of our era, the role of traditional 
manufacturing firms has depreciated, however, they have a significant effect on the global 
economy. This is, for example, demonstrated by the recent diesel scandal of the Volkswagen, 
which could potentially push the global automotive industry into a crisis. Furthermore, those 
countries that are most significantly affected by the company’s foreign direct investments (e.g., 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland) stand to lose 0.5-1.5% points from their GDP 
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growth. Although Volkswagen operates 119 production plants in 20 European countries and an 
additional 11 countries in the Americas, Asia and Africa1, all high-level decisions that basically 
influence the firm’s global strategy are made in the company’s headquarters in Wolfsburg, 
Germany2. Therefore, regardless of the fact that this city is home to only one large transnational 
corporation (TNC), Wolfsburg can be considered as one of the major command and control 
centres of the world economy, and also one of the most significant ones in the international 
automotive industry. However, there are several cities worldwide that host the headquarters of 
not only one, but dozens, of large TNCs. Because of the aggregate significance of the high-
level decisions made in these corporate headquarters, such cities have an even more powerful 
impact on the world economy (Feagin and Smith, 1998). These cities are not necessarily 
characterized as “world cities” as defined by Friedmann (1986), nor “global cities” as defined 
by Sassen (1991; 2001), but as the home to the headquarters of powerful TNCs, they can be 
considered as major command and control centres of the world economy (Knox, 1995; Godfrey 
and Zhou, 1999; Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Sassen, 2006; Csomós 2013). 
 Since the mid-1960s, momentous political and economic developments have affected 
the global economy (e.g., the emergence of the new international division of labour, the 1973 
and 1979 oil crises, the collapse of the socialist system, and the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008). These events, in part, have led to the massive growth of some developing countries (e.g., 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, and the Arab States of the Gulf) (Kose, 2010). In line with 
these developments, the number of TNCs has increased rapidly (Ietto-Gillies, 2002). Until the 
mid-1990s, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan had been considered as the homelands 
of the major TNCs (Vernon, 1992). Since that time, several giant corporations have emerged in 
developing countries, especially in China (Goldstein, 2007; Dunning et al., 2008; The 
Economist 2008; PwC, 2010). By now, TNCs in developing countries have become powerful 
enough to be able to compete with their western rivals, not only in domestic markets (Huber 
and Ennis, 2014), but also in other emerging markets; even markets of the developed countries 
(Tang, 2010). In recent years, through the acquisition of North American and Western European 
firms (Deng, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008), several large Chinese and Indian companies have 
managed to gain new markets in the developed world. Moreover, by reversing the usual 
direction of foreign direct investments (i.e., from the developed countries to the developing 
countries), they have been able to increase the power of their companies (Deng, 2007; Li, 2010; 
Pradhan and Sauvant, 2010). As a result, the traditional command and control centres of the 
developed world have, relatively speaking, been losing power, while some cities in the 
developing world have been gradually emerging as major control points of the global economy.  
My main goal is to give a comprehensive literature overview, how the term “command 
and control” has changed over time, and to present which cities were the leading command and 
control centres of the world economy in 2006 and a decade later. Furthermore, through the 
example of Beijing, I highlight why Chinese cities have become significant command and 
control centres, but have not become leading world cities.    
                                                          
1 http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/production_plants.html 
2 There is disagreement as to whether the high-level decision making process in TNCs is centralised in global 
headquarters, or whether a more diffuse structure exists (see, for example, Jones, 2002). As for Volkswagen's 
diesel scandal, it has become clear that most strategic decisions (even the technical design of the software) were 
made in Wolfsburg with the knowledge of the CEO (Smith and Parloff, 2016). 
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The structure of this paper is as follows: First, I examine the command and control 
function of cities in the world city literature. Second, I rank cities on the basis of the power of 
their command and control function, and then I present the shifting global position of cities as 
command and control centres in the past decade (2006-2015)3. Third, I focus on Beijing, the 
city in which global power has recently grown to the largest extent, and attempt to inspect the 
prospects for further growth.  
 
2. The command and control function of cities in the mainstream world city literature 
 
Globalization is one of the most important processes of today’s world. Since the second half of 
the 20th century, the restructuring of the world economy has intensified and can be characterized 
by, among other things, the increasing expansion of international trade and the rapid growth of 
foreign investments. However, the most spectacular phenomenon of economic globalization is 
generally considered as the emergence of the new international division of labour (NIDL) 
(Fröbel et al., 1980); that is, in this case, the gradually growing involvement of developing 
countries in the world economy, primarily as sites of low-cost production (Munck, 2002). As 
the orchestrator of the global reallocation of manufacturing away from core industrial countries 
towards developing countries, TNCs are generally regarded as the central actors in economic 
globalization (Cohen, 1981; Clarke, 1985; Schoenberger, 1988; Dicken, 2007). The 
organizations that make up TNCs encompass the world economy, connect national and regional 
economies, and exercise significant control over nation states (Bonanno and Constance, 2008). 
In the new world system, in parallel with the declining importance of nation states, the role of 
cities has become more significant (see, for example, Knox, 1995; Scott et al., 2001; Sassen, 
2001; Sassen, 2006). Alderson and Beckfield (2004: 812) argue that “developments of the past 
few decades are seen as producing a new global hierarchy of cities, at the apex of which are 
located what have variously been referred to as ‘world cities’ or ‘global cities’. Such cities 
constitute the key nodes or command points that exercise power over other cities in a system of 
cities and, thus, the world economy.” World cities/global cities are generally characterized as 
extremely complex entities by each fundamental theory in the field (Friedmann, 1986; 1995; 
Sassen, 1991; 2001; Beaverstock et al., 1999; Hall, 2001; Taylor, 2004); therefore, they are 
described on the basis of very different principles. However, regardless of the substantial 
differences, there are some overlapping elements in these theories. One of the most important 
elements is that world cities/global cities concentrate the headquarters of the most powerful 
TNCs worldwide, and this element makes them the major command and control centres of the 
world economy (Friedmann and Wolff, 1982; Konx, 1995; Smith and Timberlake, 1995; 
Godfrey and Zhou 1999; Alderson and Beckfield 2004; Sassen, 2006; Carroll, 2007; Taylor 
and Csomós, 2012).  
Thereinafter, I examine how the notion of command and control appears in mainstream 
world city literature, and how ongoing economic globalization has influenced researchers’ 
opinions about the command and control function of cities.  
                                                          
3 The reason for choosing the period from 2006 to 2015 are that following: on the one hand, this period covers the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the following global economic crisis of 2008-2012, and on the other hand, when 
preparing the analysis the Forbes “The Global 2,000” for 2015 was the most up-to-date dataset available.   
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 In his pioneer work, entitled The World Cities, Peter Hall (1966) identified seven major 
cities (conurbations) as world cities (London, Paris, the Randstad Holland, the Rhine-Ruhr, 
Moscow, New York, and Tokyo). According to Brenner and Keil (2006: 20), “Hall conceived 
world cities primarily as national centres that channeled international forces and interests 
towards national interests. Hall’s conception of a ‘world city’ is thus arguably a product of a 
period in which cities operated primarily as nodes within national urban systems.” It should be 
mentioned that Hall examined world cities rather as individual units from the perspective of 
urban planning, than as key actors in the world system. However, he initiated a wide range of 
criteria to define world cities, and according to two of those criteria, world cities were “the 
headquarters of major industrial concerns” and “the headquarters of the trading banks” (Hall, 
1966: 7). 
 Brenner and Keil (2006: 9) argue that the emergence of the NIDL since the late 1960s 
resulted, in large measure, from the massive expansion in the role of TNCs in the production 
and exchange of commodities on a world scale. One very important process of this period was 
the deindustrialization of the core economies (Linklater, 1990); that is, the relocation of the 
traditional low-cost manufacturing from the core economies towards the semi-peripheral and 
peripheral countries. In line with these developments, the corporate structure of manufacturing 
TNCs has undergone important changes. TNCs, as the main driving forces behind the spatial 
restructuring of the world economy, have tended to separate the geographical location of their 
high-level activities (i.e., high-level decision-making, financial activity, and the control of the 
global commodity chain) from the manufacturing activities, relocating the latter into developing 
countries (Cohen, 1981; Pacione, 2009). One of the most remarkable scholars of this period 
was Stephen Hymer, who suggested a “correspondence principle”, which attempted to identify 
and relate the centralization of control within corporations to the concentration of economic 
activity within the international economy (Dunning and Pitelis, 2010). Hymer (1972: 114) 
predicted that TNCs would tend to produce a hierarchical division of labour between 
geographical regions, and it would tend to centralize high-level decision-making occupations 
in a few key cities (i.e., the world cities/global cities) in the advanced countries, surrounded by 
a number of regional sub-capitals, and confine the rest of the world to lower levels of activity 
and income. According to Smith (2014: 101), it was Hymer who first outlined a global hierarchy 
of cities, and in that, he envisioned centralized control of the international economy as lying in 
some cities rather than others. Furthermore, Hymer (1972: 124) argued that eventually New 
York, London, Paris, Bonn, Tokyo, Moscow, and Beijing would be the major global cities 
because they would be the home to the core headquarter functions and high-level strategic 
planning of the world’s leading TNCs. 
 In the following two decades, as a legacy to Hymer’s outstanding work, several scholars 
considered the spatial concentration of corporate headquarters and high-level decision-making 
occupations as the most important characteristics to define world cities, e.g., Heenan (1977); 
Cohen (1981); Friedmann and Wolff (1982); Glickman (1987); Feagin and Smith (1987). 
However, John Friedmann’s (1986) article entitled The World City Hypothesis can be 
considered as the most significant contribution of this approach. It “consists of a series of 
generalizations regarding urbanization in the context of globalization” (Alderson and Beckfield, 
2004). The remarkable innovation of Friedmann’s work resulted in the introduction of a clear 
taxonomy for world cities, according to which, world cities had to fulfil several major criteria 
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(e.g., a major financial centre; headquarters for TNCs; international institutions; rapid growth 
of business services sector; important manufacturing centre; major transportation node; 
population size). Moreover, their home countries had to be classified by The World Bank as 
core countries. Friedmann identified New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, London, Paris, and 
Chicago as primary world cities in core countries. In his hypothesis, Friedmann attributed 
special importance to the spatial concentration of corporate headquarters; however, the criteria 
he established can be considered even more complex than that proposed by Hymer. According 
to Alderson and Beckfield (2004: 817-818), Hymer saw globalization generating a fairly static 
urban hierarchy dominated by traditional powers, while Friedmann (1995) characterized the 
world city system as a dynamic hierarchy with ranks and entrance criteria that are open. A 
decade later, Friedmann (1995: 23-24) revised his former theory by classifying New York, 
London, and Tokyo as major command and control centres exclusively. 
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, several studies have emerged that consider the spatial 
concentration of corporate headquarters, or the power of TNCs, as the key feature when 
defining world cities (see, for example Knox, 1995; Lyons and Salmon, 1995; Godfrey and 
Zhou, 1999; Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Taylor and Csomós, 2012; Csomós, 2013; Csomós 
and Derudder, 2014a); however, in the following decades, the significance of this kind of 
research approach has started to fade away. In 1991, Saskia Sassen’s pioneering work, The 
Global City, was published, and since her introduction of the global city concept, researchers’ 
conceptualization on the functional centrality of cities in the global economy has radically 
changed (Derudder, 2006). According to Sassen (2001: 4), beyond their long history as centres 
for international trade and banking, global cities (New York, London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, and 
Paris) now function in four new ways: first, as highly concentrated command points in the 
organization of the world economy; second, as key locations for finance and specialized service 
firms that have replaced manufacturing as the leading economic sector; third, as sites of 
production, including the production of innovations, in these leading industries; and fourth, as 
markets for the products and innovations produced. In her concept, Sassen’s (2001:6) focus is 
not on power, but on production: the production of those inputs that constitute the capability 
for global control. Sassen (1991; 1995; 2001) argues that the awesome power of large 
corporations is insufficient to explain the capability for global control. According to Taylor 
(2004: 25), on the basis of Sassen’s global city concept, it can be stated that global cities are 
more than merely command and control centres; they are the first global service centres in urban 
history. 
 Since the introduction of Sassen’s global city concept, it has become widely recognized 
that advanced producer service (APS) organizations are the distinctive feature of contemporary 
world city formation (Beaverstock et al., 1999). Furthermore, Peter J. Taylor (2001) introduced 
his interlocking network model (INM) in which “globalised producer services firms are the key 
‘network makers’ connecting cities in a ‘world city network’ (WCN)” (Derudder and Parnreiter, 
2014). As a consequence of these major concepts (Sassen’s global city theory and Taylor’s 
interlocking network model), APS firms and banks have become the key agents of the world 
city formation (see, for example, Beaverstock et al. 1999; Taylor, 2002; Derudder et al., 2003; 
Taylor, 2004; Derudder and Taylor, 2005; Hanssens et al., 2013; Neal, 2014; Taylor, 2014), 
and they have significantly contributed to the diminishment of the importance of TNCs as 
symbols of world cities. 
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 In this paper, I examine the command and control function of cities as originally defined 
by Hymer (1972) and Friedmann (1986); that is, I attribute the command and control function 
of cities to the power of the TNCs they host. The reason for this is that in developing countries, 
a growing number of giant manufacturing corporations and banks have been established (for 
example, the leading four company of the Forbes “The Global 2,000” for 2015 are all 
headquartered in China), and they can significantly affect the world economy (Sauvant, 2008). 
In developing countries, the high-level decision-making activities of large corporations tend to 
be geographically more concentrated in some dominant cities, and primarily in the capitals; 
therefore, some of these cities have become globally important headquarter cities (see, for 
example, Lai, 2012; Ma et al., 2013; Pan and Xia, 2014; Pan et al., 2015). However, despite the 
rapid growth of their economies, the financial systems of developing countries can generally be 
considered as fairly undeveloped (Elliot and Yan, 2013), and cannot be compared with those of 
developed countries (The World Bank, 2012). Thus, although they may possess giant banks in 
terms of assets, large stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization, and impressive goals 
for the future development of international financial centres (see, for example, Cheung, 2010; 
Lai, 2012; Pethe et al., 2014; Yildirim and Mullineux, 2015), the major financial centres of 
developing countries (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Bangkok, Sao Paulo, Mumbai) still 
cannot be considered competitive with those of the major financial centres in developed 
countries (e.g., New York, London, Paris, Frankfurt) (Du et al., 2014; Chen and Chen, 2015; 
Z/Yen Group, 2015). However, as homes to powerful corporations in terms of their size, leading 
headquarter cities in developing countries have emerged as major command and control centres 
of the world economy and as real rivals for the command and control centres of developed 
countries. While the financial side of the world economy has relative stability and is dominated 
by the financial centres of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan; in the real economy, 
radical changes have occurred, primarily thanks to the massive growth of the Chinese economy. 
 
3. Data and methods 
 
After explaining how the command and control function of cities is defined in this paper, it is 
necessary to clarify two more critical issues of the empirical analysis: first, how the command 
and control function of cities can be measured; and second, what the territorial demarcation of 
cities is. 
 
3.1. Measuring the command and control function of cities on the basis of the power of 
the TNCs they host 
 
Researchers use several methods to measure the command and control function of cities; 
however, most of them are largely influenced by subjective impressions. In general, it is very 
common to count the number of headquarters of leading TNCs and banks (perhaps the regional 
headquarters of subsidiaries) that are concentrated in given cities; and then, on the basis of this 
sum or by some sort of weighted scoring, define the position of these cities in the national/world 
city system (see, for example, Borchert, 1978; Cohen 1981; Wheeler, 1985; Holloway and 
Wheeler, 1991; Meijer, 1993; Lyons and Salmon, 1995; Abbott, 1997; Godfrey and Zhou, 1999; 
Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Taylor et al., 2009). Counting the number of TNC headquarters 
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located in given cities has key importance in several studies and can definitely be measured on 
some level in regard to the command and control function; however, this alone cannot 
adequately reflect the real power of cities as they pertain to the economy. The difference 
between these approaches (i.e., the concentration of headquarters vs. the power of cities) is 
presented through an example: According to studies that focus on the spatial concentration of 
headquarters of leading TNCs, only Tokyo, New York, London, and Paris can be considered as 
major command and control centres of the world economy (Godfrey and Zhou, 1999; Alderson 
and Beckfield, 2004, Taylor et al., 2009; MGI, 2011), while these studies give minor 
consideration to some important second-tier cities, e.g., Beijing, Osaka, and Zurich. As a matter 
of fact, the headquarters of several globally influential TNCs can be found in the major cities. 
For example, in 2015, a combined total of 365 out of 2,000 Forbes companies were 
headquartered in Tokyo, New York, London, and Paris; that is, 18% of the leading TNCs were 
concentrated in these four cities. None of the studies consider Bentonville, Arkansas, with a 
population of 40,000, as a command and control centre of the world economy. Since the city is 
home to only one single large TNC, this is not surprising. In 2015, the Forbes 2,000 companies 
were headquartered in 390 cities worldwide, but of these cities, 202 hosted only a single TNC. 
Bentonville falls into this latter category, and therefore, obviously cannot be compared with the 
major world cities that are home to 30 or more corporate headquarters. However, if one 
considers the power of a TNC as the basic determinant of the command and control function of 
cities, it should be mentioned that Bentonville is home to Walmart, the world’s largest retail 
company with more than 11,000 stores in 27 countries. Walmart is the largest non-
governmental employer in the world, with 2.2 million employees worldwide, as well as the 
largest non-governmental employer in the United States, with 1.4 million employees 
nationwide; that is, Walmart employs 1% of the United States’ work force. In 2015, Walmart 
generated revenues of $485.7 billion, which was more than that of any other company in the 
world, and, in fact, more than the combined revenues of Osaka’s 35 Forbes companies. By 
exercising enormous market power, Walmart is capable of influencing local and national wages, 
even retail prices (Basker, 2005; Bonanno and Lopez, 2012), and with its large assets, the 
company is capable of entering foreign markets (Iacovone et al., 2015). All the strategic 
decisions made in the Bentonville headquarters of Walmart can significantly affect the retailing, 
the economy of the United States (Economy in Crisis, 2012), and indirectly the world economy. 
Therefore, regardless of the obvious fact that Bentonville is not a world city, it can be 
considered as one of the most important command and control centre of the world economy.  
 In this analysis, I do not merely calculate the number of headquarters concentrated in 
any given city, but I also determine the command and control function of cities on the basis of 
the power of the TNCs they host. For this reason, several cities appear in my rankings that are 
generally not mentioned as world cities. In this analysis, I use data from the Forbes “The Global 
2,000” database from the years 2006 and 2015. These data correspond to the main financial 
data (revenues, market value, assets, and profits) of the 2,000 largest public companies of the 
world. I integrate information on the key indicators of firm size and performance. The level of 
command and control (i.e., the power of cities) is expressed by the Command and Control Index 
(CCI). CCIx,y of a given city x in a given year y is calculated as follows (Csomós, 2013; Csomós 
and Derudder, 2014b): 
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CCIx,y =  ∑
Ri,x,y + Ai,x,y + Pi,x,y + MVi,x,y
4
nx,y
i=1
 
Where: 
 Ri,x,y = the proportion of revenues in the total dataset; 
 Ai,x,y = the proportion of assets in the total dataset; 
 Pi,x,y = the proportion of profit in the total dataset; 
 MVi,x,y = the proportion of market value in the total dataset; 
 i = the number of the company headquartered in city in given year (i = 1,…,nx,y); 
 n = the total number of companies headquartered in city x in year y; 
In conclusion, the CCI is a measure without unit and reflects to the power of cities as command 
and control centres.  
 
3.2. Territorial demarcation of “cities” 
 
Another fundamental issue of this analysis is the territorial demarcation of cities. Derudder 
(2006) argues that in Sassen’s global city concept, a global city corresponds to those units that 
have linkage to the world economy and where business activities are conducted (i.e., the city 
that hosts the traditional central business district), while in Friedmann’s world city concept, a 
world city corresponds to a much larger territorial unit; such as a metropolitan region, in which 
corporate headquarters are spread out over a larger area. In this paper, I consider Friedmann’s 
world city definition as the basis for the territorial demarcation of the empirical analysis; 
therefore, I integrate individual headquarters’ cities and towns into large urban zones. Florida 
and Jonas (1991), Lyons and Salmon (1995), and even Sassen (2006) all stress that in the United 
States, and then in Europe, the relocation of headquarters from large cities to suburban areas 
has become quite common since the 1970s. This phenomenon is what Florida and Jonas (1991) 
refer to as the “decentralization of corporate organizations”. According to Garreau (1991), 
Brenner (2002), and Ross and Levine (2012), this development has resulted in a significant 
change in the suburban network of metropolitan areas: suburbs have begun to play an active 
role in the economy. Because of the general trend of the suburbanization of corporate 
headquarters since the 1970s, suburbs, regarding their economic functions, cannot adequately 
be separated from the central cities of their metropolitan regions (Muller, 1978).  
 When defining “cities” as territorial units, I relied on the territorial demarcation of 
respective national statistical offices, the ESPON EGTC in the European Union 
(www.espon.eu), and the Office of Management and Budget in the United States 
(www.whitehouse.gov/omb). For example, in my framework, “New York” corresponds to the 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is home to the 
headquarters of 87 Forbes 2,000 companies. However, of these 87 companies, 55 are 
headquartered in New York City, and 32 are located in 27 smaller or larger cities (Armonk, 
Paramus, Roseland, etc.) within the New York metropolitan area. In Japan, for example, Osaka 
corresponds to the large Keihanshin metropolitan region that encompasses the metropolitan 
areas of Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. Paris corresponds roughly to the entire Ile-de-France region, 
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which includes 1,800 cities and towns. In line with this method of the territorial demarcation of 
cities as command and control centres, I define cities in the same way in all countries.4 
 In 2006 the Forbes 2,000 companies were headquartered in 687 cities, which could be 
integrated into 353 metropolitan regions; and in 2015, they were located in 683 cities and could 
be integrated into 390 metropolitan regions. 
 
4. Changing position of cities as command and control centres between 2006 and 2015 
 
Reed (1981); Meyer (1986); Glickman (1987); Thrift (1989); Sassen (1994); Budd (1995); 
Short et al. (1996); Godfrey and Zhou (1999); Sassen (2001); Taylor et al. (2009); Lee et al. 
(2012) stress the outstanding roles of New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris in the global 
economy as major world cities, global cities, financial centres, etc. The ranking, on the basis of 
the value of the CCI5, also shows that until 2006, New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris had 
been the leading command and control centres (Table 1), with more than 30% of the combined 
value of the CCI. However, in more recent years, radical changes have occurred, primarily due 
to the massive growth of Beijing’s command and control function. On the basis of its CCI value, 
the Chinese capital arrived right behind the major cities in 2007, then, between 2012 and 2014, 
Beijing outranked Paris (2012), London (2013), and Tokyo (2014), and finally it managed to 
surpass New York in 2015, becoming the leading command and control centre of the world 
economy.  
 
Table 1. Ranking the leading command and control centres in 2006 and 2015 on the basis of 
their CCI value 
Rank City/Metro Country 
Number 
of HQs 
CCI 
2006 
City/Metro Country 
Number 
of HQs 
CCI 
2015 
1 New York United States 97 8.897 Beijing China 59 7.610 
2 Tokyo Japan 199 8.088 New York United States 87 6.588 
3 London United Kingdom 94 6.547 Tokyo Japan 142 6.279 
4 Paris France 66 5.695 London United Kingdom 79 5.139 
5 Dallas United States 28 2.201 Paris France 57 4.502 
6 Zurich Switzerland 13 1.843 San Jose United States 28 2.374 
7 San Francisco United States 25 1.670 San Francisco United States 21 2.321 
8 Seoul South Korea 44 1.659 Seoul South Korea 59 2.241 
9 Amsterdam Netherlands 14 1.607 Hong Kong China/Hong Kong 55 2.228 
10 Chicago United States 38 1.583 Washington United States 18 1.746 
11 Houston United States 34 1.527 Toronto Canada 17 1.512 
12 San Jose United States 29 1.505 Dallas United States 22 1.510 
13 Washington United States 21 1.437 Chicago United States 35 1.474 
14 Toronto Canada 20 1.405 Zurich Switzerland 23 1.472 
15 Charlotte United States 8 1.356 Moscow Russia 20 1.280 
16 Munich Germany 9 1.345 Houston United States 25 1.212 
                                                          
4 In the case of the United States “cities” correspond to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget), but not to Combined Statistical Areas. In the case of the European Union “cities” 
correspond to Functional Urban Areas (as defined by the ESPON), but not to polynuclear metropolitan areas. 
5 In this paper I examined the command and control function of cities in a closed system, and in this system cities’ 
CCI values are relative values. This means that the total value of the CCI never grows over time, and always 
remains the same. It necessarily follows from the way the CCI values are calculated in this system that the CCI 
values of some cities will decrease, whereas those of some cities will increase. These cities, of course, not winners 
and losers, the change of cities’ CCI value expresses the change of their relative positions. As a matter of fact, the 
world economy is expanding, and cities’ command and control function also grows (in the case of some cities 
slower, and in other cases faster). 
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17 Madrid Spain 19 1.324 Shanghai China 20 1.114 
18 Osaka Japan 47 1.296 Stockholm Sweden 21 1.034 
19 Beijing China 15 1.294 Munich Germany 8 0.989 
20 Atlanta United States 19 1.177 Minneapolis United States 15 0.975 
21 Minneapolis United States 20 1.160 Shenzhen China 15 0.971 
22 The Hague Netherlands 3 1.145 Seattle United States 11 0.937 
23 Bridgeport United States 12 1.104 Sydney Australia 20 0.934 
24 Stockholm Sweden 23 1.064 Madrid Spain 16 0.910 
25 Edinburgh United Kingdom 3 1.029 Mumbai India 24 0.897 
26 Nagoya Japan 23 1.027 Nagoya Japan 14 0.876 
27 Hong Kong China/Hong Kong 35 1.019 Atlanta United States 17 0.865 
28 Seattle United States 12 1.012 Osaka Japan 35 0.864 
29 Detroit United States 14 0.914 Taipei City Taiwan 31 0.809 
30 Frankfurt Germany 7 0.858 Melbourne Australia 9 0.776 
31 Rome Italy 8 0.852 Newbury United Kingdom 1 0.753 
32 Los Angeles United States 27 0.821 Bridgeport United States 13 0.725 
33 Melbourne Australia 12 0.760 The Hague Netherlands 4 0.717 
34 Cincinnati United States 12 0.747 Omaha United States 4 0.714 
35 Moscow Russia 8 0.723 Los Angeles United States 21 0.699 
36 Fayetteville* United States 3 0.715 Sao Paulo Brazil 12 0.673 
37 Milan Italy 15 0.702 Fayetteville* United States 3 0.671 
38 Sydney Australia 20 0.693 Frankfurt Germany 5 0.652 
39 Philadelphia United States 19 0.675 Philadelphia United States 15 0.649 
40 Brussels Belgium 11 0.609 Charlotte United States 4 0.635 
41 Richmond United States 9 0.578 Singapore Singapore 20 0.630 
42 Calgary Canada 17 0.561 Basel Switzerland 6 0.627 
43 Taipei City Taiwan 26 0.555 Dublin Ireland 18 0.622 
44 Basel Switzerland 8 0.532 Boston United States 16 0.593 
45 Riyadh Saudi Arabia 5 0.530 Amsterdam Netherlands  10 0.561 
46 Düsseldorf Germany 5 0.508 Detroit United States 10 0.558 
47 Boston United States 17 0.492 Cincinnati United States 8 0.524 
48 Hartford United States 6 0.477 Calgary Canada 13 0.473 
49 Helsinki Finland 15 0.466 Montreal Canada 13 0.459 
50 Stuttgart Germany 4 0.454 Riyadh Saudi Arabia 15 0.459 
*The Fayetteville metropolitan area includes Bentonville, Arkansas; the headquarters city of Walmart. 
 
Similarly to that of Beijing, the CCI value of other major Chinese cities grew rapidly; therefore, 
Hong Kong (ranked 27th in 2006, 9th in 2015), Shanghai (ranked 111th in 2006, 17th in 2015), 
and Shenzhen (ranked 129th in 2006, 21st in 2015) also appeared among the leading command 
and control centres in 2015. Furthermore, the latter two cities showed the most significant 
increase in terms of their CCI values in the past decade: the CCI value of Shenzhen increased 
by almost 1,000%, Shanghai’s increased by almost 800%, whereas Beijing’s showed the third-
largest increase (Table 2).  
 In 2006, New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris were primarily followed by North 
American cities. In fact, six out of the next ten cities (5th-14th in the ranking) were located in 
the United States, and one of them was located in Canada. Two European cities, Zurich and 
Amsterdam, also belonged to this group, as well as Seoul in East Asia. By 2015, the CCI value 
of Amsterdam decreased by 65%, and its position significantly weakened (ranked 9th in 2006, 
45th in 2015), while Zurich showed a much smaller decrease in its position (ranked 6th in 2006, 
14th in 2015). The CCI value of Seoul increased by 35%; however, its position did not change 
(ranked 8th in both years). Furthermore, during this decade, Hong Kong showed a creditable 
growth and by 2015, occupied a much better position. In 2015, a number of North American 
cities could be found among the leading command and control centres; however, their positions 
in the ranking changed significantly. The positions of Dallas (ranked 5th in 2006, 12th in 2015), 
11 
 
Chicago (ranked 10th in 2006, 13th in 2015), and Houston (ranked 11th in 2006, 16th in 2015) 
weakened, while the position of San Jose improved, and by 2015, that city arrived right behind 
the major command and control centres (ranked 6th in 2015). Washington and Toronto also 
showed a smaller increase in their positions, while San Francisco remained the same (ranked 
7th in both years); however, its CCI value grew by 39%. 
 As can be seen in Table 1, in 2006, the major command and control centres (New York, 
Tokyo, London, and Paris) were followed mostly by cities of developed countries: 20 out of the 
leading 50 cities were located in the United Sates, and 17 were located in Europe. The 
developing countries6 were singularly represented by Beijing (ranked 19th), Moscow (ranked 
35th), and Riyadh (ranked 45th). By 2015, the number of cities in developing countries among 
the leading command and control centres grew, but not significantly. In fact, aside from Beijing, 
Moscow, and Riyadh, only Shanghai, Shenzhen, Mumbai, and Sao Paulo entered into this group 
of leading cities. However, it is worth noting that the CCI value of these cities increased 
dynamically in this period: the CCI value of Mumbai increased by 152%, while that of Sao 
Paulo increased by 189%, not mentioning the extreme growth of the major Chinese cities 
(Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Beijing) (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. TOP 25 command and control centres with the largest positive and negative CCI 
change 
Rank City/Metro* Country 
Positive CCI 
Change, 
2006/2015 (%) 
City/Metro Country* 
Negative CCI 
Change, 
2006/2015 (%) 
1 Shenzhen China 999.06 Austin, Texas United States -83.67 
2 Shanghai China 796.39 Kansas City United States -77.80 
3 Beijing China 488.04 Amsterdam Netherlands -65.07 
4 Leuven Belgium 327.50 Hamilton Bermuda -65.06 
5 Newbury United Kingdom 226.66 Edinburgh United Kingdom -62.24 
6 Sao Paulo Brazil 189.10 Richmond United States -61.04 
7 Mumbai India 152.32 Cleveland United States -58.03 
8 
Hong Kong 
China/Hong 
Kong 118.65 Charlotte United States -53.19 
9 Wolfsburg Germany 106.31 Rome Italy -51.25 
10 Barcelona Spain 104.18 Brussels Belgium -47.97 
11 Providence United States 103.44 Essen Germany -46.33 
12 Lisbon Portugal 95.03 Athens Greece -45.98 
13 Santiago Chile 94.61 Düsseldorf Germany -44.53 
14 Jakarta Indonesia 86.09 Oklahoma City United States -42.34 
15 Moscow Russia 76.96 Bonn Germany -42.08 
16 Bangkok Thailand 74.77 Phoenix United States -41.35 
17 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 72.32 Milan Italy -41.06 
18 Brasília Brazil 68.86 Helsinki Finland -39.84 
19 Portland, Oregon United States 66.91 Detroit United States -38.95 
20 Singapore Singapore 66.60 The Hague Netherlands -37.36 
21 Omaha United States 58.68 Columbus, Ohio United States -36.60 
22 San Jose United States 57.76 Rio de Janeiro Brazil -35.29 
23 San Diego United States 53.98 Bridgeport United States -34.36 
24 Dublin Ireland 48.53 Osaka Japan -33.34 
25 Taipei City Taiwan 45.74 Dallas United States -31.41 
*Requirement: the combined value of CCI 2006 and CCI 2015 of a given city should exceed 0.2.  
 
                                                          
6 Definition of developing countries is based on the classification of the International Monetary Fund’s World 
Economic Outlook, April 2015. 
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The geographical shift of the world’s command and control function shows a typical pattern. 
On the one hand, along with the significant growth of the CCI value of the Chinese cities, the 
CCI value of cities located in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and those of Indian cities also 
increased by more than 100% (Figure 1). On the other hand, the CCI value of the traditional 
command and control centres located in North America (particularly in the United States), 
Western Europe, and Japan decreased significantly. These shifts correspond to the opinion of 
Castells et al. (2012: 12): the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the following global economic 
crisis of 2008-2012 can rather be considered as two examples of “non-global global crisis of 
capitalism”; because, for example, this crisis only slightly affected the economies of Latin 
America and China.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Change of the value of the CCI by geographical subgroups 
 
There are some cities among the leading command and control centres in which CCI value has 
been influenced by only one large TNC. The best examples are Leuven (Anheuser-Busch 
InBev), Newbury (Vodafone Group), and Wolfsburg (Volkswagen AG). Of course, the position 
of these cities is very unstable. The outstanding financial performance of Vodafone in financial 
year 2014/2015 was largely due to the fact that the company sold its 45% stake in Verizon 
Wireless to Verizon Communications for $130 billion. It is assumed that in the future, the CCI 
value of Leuven will also grow, since Anheuser-Busch InBev announced the acquisition of its 
largest competitor, SABMiller (headquartered in London) for $104 billion. Conversely, after 
the diesel scandal of Volkswagen, the CCI value of Wolfsburg will predictably decrease. 
 Most cities with the largest negative CCI change are typically home to more than one 
TNC, but they are generally facing deep structural crisis in their economy. To illustrate, since 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the financial sectors of Amsterdam and Edinburgh have 
significantly weakened; Hamilton, Bermuda has been continuously losing the headquarters of 
TNCs (which generally have been moving to Dublin or Zurich) since the Obama administration 
promised to act against tax havens; and Detroit’s automotive industry has recovered slowly.  
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 In conclusion, it can be stated that in the past decade, but primarily since the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008, the relative power of the traditional command and control centres; i.e., that 
of New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris, has significantly weakened. Beijing has become the 
major control point of China, the newly emerged powerhouse of the world economy, and now 
the largest command and control centre in the world (see also Csomós and Tóth, 2016). In 
addition, the pressure on New York, Tokyo, London, and Paris has intensified due to the fact 
that the combined CCI value (4.695 in 2015) of the San Jose-San Francisco metropolitan region 
has radically increased, and outranked that of Paris in 2015.  
 
5. The rise of Beijing and the sources of its power 
 
By 2015, on the basis of the power of headquartered companies, Beijing has become the largest 
command and control centre of the world economy. This means, first, that Beijing has managed 
to surpass its most powerful regional rivals, Tokyo and Seoul, in less than a decade; and second, 
the Chinese capital is the only city that has ever managed to outrank the four major command 
and control centres, New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris. 
This rapid growth of the Chinese capital’s command and control function can primarily 
be attributed to the fact that Beijing-based state-owned banks and energy companies have 
become extremely powerful (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Industry-specific distribution of the command and control function of Beijing 
 
Due to China’s enormous energy demand, generated by the large transportation sector (Dargay 
and Gately 2010; Lin and Xie 2013), and the rapidly growing number of private cars (MGI, 
2006; 2013), oil and gas consumption has been continuously increasing in this country. Since 
1993, China has become a net oil importer, and by 2012, its dependency on imported oil 
exceeded 60% (Zhang, 2014). The Chinese oil companies are among the largest foreign 
investors in the global oil and gas industry. They invest and operate worldwide, including in 
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Africa and Latin America, where they are the most important actors. According to projections 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA), it is foreseeable that Chinese oil and gas 
consumption will dramatically increase in the future, and China’s national oil companies 
(NOCs) are expected to be the instruments to satisfy the growing demand (IEA, 2011). The 
headquarters of all three state-owned oil giants, PetroChina, Sinopec, and CNOOC, are located 
in Beijing; therefore, the dominant role of the Chinese capital in the energy sector is not 
surprising (Pegg, 2012; Pan et al., 2015). 
 The extreme power of Beijing in terms of the value of the CCI does not 
straightforwardly show its role in the global financial sector. With respect to its CCI value, it 
could be easily stated that Beijing has become the world’s major financial centre. In 2015, the 
CCI value of Beijing’s financial sector (4.942) was greater than that of Paris (4.502), and was 
in fact greater than the combined CCI value of Germany (4.108). However, the reality is more 
complicated than what the numbers show, because Beijing is neither considered as a globally 
important financial centre, nor even as the leading financial centre within China (Lai, 2012; 
Chen and Chen, 2014). The future role of the Chinese capital in the global financial sector is 
unpredictable. On the one hand, in contrast to the international financial centres, Beijing does 
not have a stock exchange; therefore, Beijing-headquartered companies are listed in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, but more frequently in the stock 
exchanges of New York, London, and Frankfurt (Gillis, 2014). Chen and Chen (2014: 18) claim 
that Beijing’s bid to become an international financial centre is hampered by its lack of a stock 
market. According to Taylor et al. (2014: 868), Beijing is better connected to political world 
cities such as Washington and Brussels, and to other Pacific Asian cities, than to Shanghai, 
while the latter is better connected to the international financial centres such as New York, 
London, and Frankfurt. Although all giant state-owned banks (e.g., Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) are headquartered in 
Beijing, the bulk of the domestic and offshore financial activities are carried out in the triad of 
Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen (Zhao, 2003; Zhao et al., 2004; KPMG, 2011; Lai 2012). 
On the other hand, Beijing-based banks control large amount of assets: in 2015, the combined 
assets of nine of Beijing’s major and regional banks ranked by Forbes exceeded $13,343 billion, 
more than that of any other financial centres in the world, even three times more than Japan’s 
GDP7. As a result, Beijing-based banks are becoming more aggressive about expanding outside 
of China (Forbes, 2012), which eventually could contribute to the positioning of Beijing as a 
major international financial centre.    
It is worth noting that this exposure to the financial sector can now be regarded as the 
main source of Beijing’s increasing power, adding the Chinese capital to the ranks as a global 
leader command and control centre, but this exposure can pose a threat as well. In accordance 
with Sassen’s (2001) definition of global cities as key locations for finance, New York, Tokyo, 
London, and Paris were ranked top in the CCI ranking for 2015, and their positions were largely 
influenced by the performance of their financial sectors. However, the contribution of the 
financial sector to the total CCI value of Beijing is even larger than that of the global cities 
(Figure 3). While the contribution of the financial sector to the CCI value of Tokyo, Paris, and 
                                                          
7 The World Bank, 2016: GDP at market prices (current US$) 
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London remains under 50% respectively, and New York slightly exceeds 50%, the ratio of the 
financial sector in the total CCI value of Beijing is 65%, which means that Beijing’s command 
and control function significantly depends on the performance of its financial sector.    
 
 
 
Figure 3. Contribution of the financial sector to the CCI value of the major command and 
control centres 
 
A third dimension of Beijing’s command and control function has recently emerged. In 2015, 
a China-led international financial institution, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
was launched with the goal of providing financing for infrastructure projects of developing 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region. It is now expected that Chinese construction services 
companies will be the main actors of large infrastructure development projects abroad. Since 
80% of the major construction services companies are headquartered in the Chinese capital, it 
can be predicted that the power of Beijing’s command and control function will gradually 
increase. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Over the past half-century, but primarily since the publication of Friedmann’s world city 
hypothesis paper in 1986, it has become common to rank cities on the basis of the concentration 
and/or the economic performance of the TNCs they host. However, in the 1980s, both the 
United States and the United Kingdom introduced neoliberal economic policies that have 
resulted in the growing significance of finance and services and the diminishing significance of 
the traditional manufacturing sector in these leading economies. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, especially as a result of Sassen’s book The Global City, researchers have begun to study 
economic globalization from a different perspective; according to which, the significance of the 
concentration of manufacturing firms as features of world cities has constantly depreciated (see, 
for example, Sassen 1991; Castells 1996; Taylor 2004). This development has led to some 
varying perspectives. For example, in the ranking of the Globalization and World Cities 
Research Network, in terms of their advanced producer services, Dubai, which is not a 
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particularly important command and control centre, occupies a more distinguished position 
(Alfa+) than Seoul (Alfa–), one of the largest economic hubs in the world8. However, on the 
basis of Friedmann’s world city approach, these two cities are considered in a different way. 
Seoul, as home to 59 powerful TNCs with combined revenues of $1,337 billion, is one of the 
major command and control centres in the world (ranked 8th in the CCI ranking for 2015), 
whereas, only six companies of regional importance with combined revenues of $15 billion are 
headquartered in Dubai (ranked 125th in the CCI ranking for 2015). Therefore, with respect to 
the power of large companies, regardless of their sectors, an alternative urban hierarchy can be 
created.  
In this paper, I have examined the position of cities as command and control centres on 
the basis of the power of their headquartered corporations. The result shows that until 2012, 
New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris; i.e. the global cities, were the leading command and 
control centres. However, due to the massive growth of the Chinese economy, the gap between 
the global cities and Beijing gradually closed, and by 2015, the Chinese capital outranked all 
the global cities. The outstanding performance of corporations operating in financial, energy, 
and construction services sectors is the driving force behind Beijing’s increasing global power. 
In addition, the leading position of the global cities as command and control centres has been 
threatened by the San Francisco-San Jose metropolitan region, a newly emerging economic hub 
in the United States. 
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